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1. Introduction
It has been proposed that the United States constitution be amended to make it unlawful
for there to be a de¯cit in the federal government's budget. In some states in the United
States, there are already constitutional prohibitions or restrictions on government de¯cits.
The Maastricht Treaty calls for ¯nes to be levied on countries in the European Union
that incur budget de¯cits beyond the prescribed limits (currently 3% of GDP). Some
governments are already obliged to limit their budget de¯cits by the terms of their loan
agreements with international agencies.
What are the economic e®ects of restrictions on government budget de¯cits? The
popular wisdom is that these restrictions do matter, but there is debate about their
desirability. The popular view is supported by empirical evidence that government budget
de¯cit restrictions are e®ective in reducing government expenditure. See, for example,
Alesina et al. (1996), Poterba (1996), and Bohn and Inman (1996), studies based on
comparisons across the states of the U.S. On the other hand, the thrust of the existing
theoretical literature is that the de¯cit restrictions are ine®ective in the sense that the set
of perfect-foresight equilibrium allocations is independent of the sequence of government
budget de¯cits. See, for example, Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987), Kelly (1991), and
Kotliko® (1993). These theoretical results are mainly based on models with only one
(representative) consumer per generation.
In the present paper, we take a fresh look at the theory of budget-de¯cit restrictions.
For the analysis, we adopt a pure-exchange overlapping-generations model with several
consumers per generation and several commodities per period. We allow for distortionary
taxes, focusing on the case of consumption taxes. We also allow for the fact that tax
schedules cannot be made perfectly individual-speci¯c. For example, it might be the
case that each consumer in a given generation must face the same tax schedule, possibly
because of limits on the information of the tax authority or possibly for considerations of
fundamental fairness. In this sense, we allow for (at least partially) anonymous taxation.
We apply the approach of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) [see also Mirrlees (1976)] to
modeling government behavior. It is assumed that the government knows the distribution
of individual characteristics within a given consumer class (say, the individuals of a given
generation), but it either does not know or cannot act upon the characteristics of any
particular individual within this class. It is also assumed that { even though the govern-
ment knows the distribution of commodities in ¯ne detail { it cannot tax commodities in
the same commodity class at di®erent rates.
The advantage of lump-sum taxes (if they are feasible) is that they are nondistor-
tionary. If perfectly personalized lump-sum taxes were feasible, then every Pareto opti-
mal allocation could be decentralized. If perfectly personalized taxes are not available,
then consumption taxes while distortionary have some potential advantages for income
redistribution over lump-sum taxes. Everyone in the same tax class must get the same
2
lump-sum transfer or tax. Everyone in the same tax class must face the same consump-
tion tax rates, but by varying the rates over the commodity tax classes, the government
is typically able to \redistribute income" within a given consumer tax class. Of course, if
the taxes are distortionary, such redistribution of income is not costless.
For completeness, we show that if there are lump-sum taxes, then the set of equilib-
rium allocations is independent of the sequence of budget de¯cits. Hence, in this case,
restrictions on the de¯cits are irrelevant. This is in accord with the existing results of
Kelly (1991) and others, but our result is somewhat stronger in that we have several
commodities per period, distortionary tax instruments in addition to the lump-sum in-
struments, and restrictions that tax rates be identical in the same consumer tax class and
in the same commodity tax class. The reasoning behind this so-called irrelevance result
is clear. The government's borrowing and lending is restricted in every period. These
restrictions are not binding because the government can in e®ect borrow from (or lend
to) consumers whose own credit is unrestricted by increasing (decreasing) their taxes in
their youth while \repaying them" (\collecting from them") in their old age in such a way
as to keep total lifetime taxation unchanged. Of course, even if only one consumer class
faces perfect credit markets there would be de¯cit restriction irrelevance with lump-sum
taxation, since the government needs only one such consumer per generation to meet the
de¯cit targets.
The situation is di®erent if neither lump-sum taxes nor perfectly personalized taxes are
available. We analyze an economy in which the only taxes are (distortionary) proportional
consumption taxes. In this economy, the relevance of the restrictions on the government
budget de¯cits depends crucially on the number of consumers per generation relative to
the number of independent tax instruments per period. The reason for this is that, when
too few tax instruments are available, meeting the restrictions on the budget de¯cit is
likely to necessitate redistributions of wealth. The government's allocative potency is
further limited by the fact that in equilibrium the pre-tax and post-tax prices of each
good must be nonnegative. Hence, even in the unrealistic case where the number of
instruments is large relative to the number of individuals, large changes in the restrictions
on the government budget de¯cit might a®ect the set of equilibrium allocations. The
possibility for complete budget irrelevance is further reduced by problems associated with
the in¯nite horizon in the overlapping-generations model. The government might be able
to keep a prescribed de¯cit sequence for a ¯nite number of periods (no matter how many),
but might be unable to commit to the full in¯nite sequence of de¯cits while supporting
the original allocation of resources.
The relevance of government de¯cit restrictions is also investigated in economies in
which some consumers face credit constraints. For economies with lump-sum taxes and
consumer borrowing constraints, de¯cit restrictions are likely to be relevant unless the
government can \identify" a consumer in each generation whose borrowing is unrestricted.
For economies with only consumption taxes, the conditions for irrelevance are altered by
the consumer borrowing restrictions but they still depend on the number of instruments
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relative to the number of consumer types. Irrelevance of de¯cit restrictions is less unlikely
with consumption taxation rather than lump-sum taxation, because commodity taxes can
help the government in providing liquidity to some member of a consumer class. Formal
techniques of this study are also useful for asking whether or not it is possible to ¯nd
a ¯scal policy that eliminates individual consumer liquidity constraints while meeting a
government de¯cit requirement. This can only be feasible if the de¯cit in the ¯rst period
is unrestricted.
We introduce the model in section 2. Feasible ¯scal policies are de¯ned in section 3.
Section 4 is on equilibrium. Section 5 contains our analysis of the economy with lump-sum
taxation. Sections 6 and 7 contain the heart of our analysis. Section 6 is on consumption
taxes, while Section 7 is on borrowing restrictions. An important caveat is in Section 8,
our concluding remarks. In the text our \proofs" are careful \counting arguments" (of
equations and unknowns). The full (matrix rank) analysis is in the appendix.
2. The basic model
We employ a pure-exchange overlapping-generations model in which there are n di®erent
consumers per generation and ` perishable commodities per period. We suppose without
loss of generality that consumers live for two periods. The government collects taxes and
distributes transfers. In the present paper, we focus on two types of instruments: (nondis-
tortionary) lump-sum taxes and (distortionary) consumption taxes. The full spectrum of
these taxes is typically not available to the government: individuals in the same consumer
tax class must face the same tax schedule; i.e. taxation must be anonymous within a given
class of individuals. The two limiting cases are perfectly individualized taxation (where
each consumer tax class contains only one individual) and perfectly anonymous taxation
(where each individual is in the same consumer tax class). The government is also con-
strained to set the same tax rate for each commodity in the same commodity class. The
two limiting cases are perfect commodity discrimination (where each commodity tax class
contains only one commodity) and total lack of commodity discrimination (where there
is only one commodity tax class per period).
For simplicity, we assume that public consumption of commodities is exogenously
determined. Public consumption can then be set at zero without loss of generality.
In most of the paper, it is assumed that capital markets (borrowing and lending
markets) are perfect. In Section 7, we treat the case in which individuals face (exogenously
given) restrictions on their credit.
Our set-up is based on the Samuelson (1958) overlapping-generations model presented
in Balasko and Shell (1980, 1981, 1986), but new tax instruments must be de¯ned. As in
Balasko and Shell (1981), let msth 2 R be the lump-sum money transfer to consumer h of
generation t in period s; if msth is negative, then the consumer is paying a lump-sum tax.
We add consumption taxes. Let ¿ sith 2 R be the tax rate in own commodity units levied
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on consumer h of generation t on his consumption of commodity i in period s; if ¿ sith is
negative then this consumption activity is being subsidized.
Let xsth = (x
s1
th ; :::; x
si
th; :::; x
sl
th) 2 R`++ be the vector of consumption in period s by
individual h of generation t and !sth = (!
s1
th ; :::; !
si
th; :::; w
s`
th) 2 R`++ be the vector of endow-
ments in period s of individual h from generation t for t = 0 ; 1 ; ::: ; s = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ; and
h = 1 ; :::; n: Let msth 2 R be the money transfer in period s to consumer h of generation
t, and ¿ sth = (¿
s1
th ; :::; ¿
si
th; :::; ¿
sl
th) 2 R` be the vector of consumption tax rates in period s
for consumer h of generation t. Consumers from generation 0 are alive in period 1 , while
consumers from generation t (t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ; ) are alive in periods t and t + 1 . Hence it is
convenient to de¯ne the following vectors:
x0h = x
1
0h 2 R`++; xth = (xtth; xt+1th ) 2 R2`++;
!0h = !
1
0h 2 R`++; !th = (!tth; !t+1th ) 2 R2 `++;
m0h = m
1
0h 2 R; mth = (mtth;mt+1th ) 2 R2 ;
and
¿0h = ¿
1
0h 2 R`; ¿th = (¿ tth; ¿ t+1th ) 2 R2`:
Let ps = (ps1 ; :::; psi; :::; ps`) 2 R`++ be the vector of present (before-tax) prices for
commodities available in period t and let
qsth = (q
s1
th ; :::; q
si
th; :::; q
s`
th) 2 R`++
be the present after-tax vector of commodity prices for consumer h of generation t in
period s. De¯ne the after-tax present price vectors facing consumers by
q0h = q
1
0h = p
1 + ¿0h 2 R`++
and (2.1)
qth = (q
t
th; q
t+h
th ) = (p
t; pt+1 ) + (¿ tth; ¿
t+1
th ) 2 R2`++
for h = 1 ; ::: ; n. Then de¯ne the following quantity and price sequences: x = ((x0h)
h=n
h=1 ; :::;
(xth)
h=n
h=1 ; :::), ! = ((!0h)
h=n
h=1 ; :::; (!th)
h=n
h=1 ; :::), p = (p
1 ; :::; pt; :::), m = ((m0h)
h=n
h=1 ; :::;
(mth)
h=n
h=1 ; :::), ¿ = ((¿0h)
h=n
h=1 ; :::; (¿th)
h=n
h=1 ; :::) and q = ((q0h)
h=n
h=1 ; :::; (qth)
h=n
h=1 ; :::):
We assume that the preferences of consumer h from generation t can be described by
the utility function uth de¯ned over the consumption set of all strictly positive xt's (i.e.
R`++ or R2 `++) with the properties:
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(2.2) uth is twice di®erentiable with strictly positive ¯rst-order derivatives and
with corresponding negative de¯nite Hessian
and
(2.3) the closure of every indi®erence surface of uth is in the consumption set
(i.e. R`++ or R2 `++).
These rather standard assumptions simplify the comparative statics. See Balasko and
Shell (1980, 1981) for their application in overlapping-generations models. Note that we
have also assumed that the endowment of the consumer lies in his consumption set, i.e.
we have !th is in R`++ or R2 `++.
The behavior of consumer h (h = 1 ; 2 ; :::; n) from generation t (t = 1 ; 2 ; :::) is then
described by:
maximize uth(x
t
th; x
t+1
th )
subject to
qtth ¢ xtth + ptmxtmth = pt ¢ !tth + ptmmtth
qt+1th ¢ xt+1th + pt+1 ;mxt+1 ;mth = pt+1 ¢ !t+1th + pt+1 ;mmt+1th
xt+mth + x
t+1 ;m
th = 0 and xth = (x
t
th; x
t+1
th ) 2 R2`++
(2.4)
where xsmth 2 R is the net addition to his money holdings in period s by consumer h of
generation t. The last equation in (2.4) is the requirement that the end of life money
holding be zero.
If borrowing and lending markets are perfect, then an equilibrium (no arbitrage) con-
dition is that the present price of money be constant, i.e.,
ptm = pt+1 ;m = pm 2 R+ (2.5)
The nominal (coupon) rate of interest on money is assumed without loss of gener-
ality to be zero. Hence the only return on holding money is the capital gain relative
to commodities. Condition (2.5) is thus that money appreciate in value relative to any
commodity at the commodity rate of interest. Condition (2.5) allows us to rewrite (2.4)
as [see Balasko and Shell (1981)]:
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maximize uth(x
t
th; x
t+1
th )
subject to
qtth ¢ xtth + qt+1th ¢ xt+1th
= pt ¢ !tth + pt+1 ¢ !t+1th + pmmtth + pmmt+1th
(2.6)
for h = 1 ; 2 ; :::; n and t = 1 ; 2 ; :::. Hence the transfers mth = (m
t
th;m
t+1
th ) 2 R2 a®ect
the behavior of the consumer only through the lifetime transfer ¹th = m
t
th +m
t+1
th 2 R.
In what follows, we assume that the price of money is positive. Then because of the
absence of money illusion, we can normalize taxes and transfers so that pm = 1 without
loss of generality.
It remains to describe the behavior of the older generation (t = 0 ) in period 1. Con-
sumer 0h maximizes his utility subject to his one-period budget constraint:
maximize u0h(x
1
0h)
subject to
q10h ¢ x10h + x1m0h = p1 ¢ !10h +m10h
x1m0h = 0;
and
x10h 2 R`++:
(2.7)
3. Feasible ¯scal policies
In the simplest case, a ¯scal policy could be any sequences of lump-sum transfers m
and commodity tax rates ¿ . This would be the case of full ¯scal potency. There are,
however, typically further restrictions on the powers of the government. It is unlikely
that the tax authorities can di®erentiate individuals su±ciently to use the full range of
personalized taxation. Some personalizations of the schedules might require too much
detailed information about individuals, might be very costly to administer1, or might be
deemed to be unfair.
1See Heller and Shell (1974) for the e®ects on tax policy of costs of tax administration.
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On the other hand, governments can and do base taxes and other policies on demo-
graphic characteristics. Age and family size are frequently used in tax policies. To qualify
for a government retirement transfer, one must meet an age test. Tax rates for with-
drawals from private retirement plans in the U.S. depend on the age of the withdrawer.
For U.S. personal income taxation, the \personal exemption" (from gross income) is dou-
bled for those over 65 years; other deductions and exemptions (from income) are based
on family size. In Europe, the fare on public transportation is reduced for older people
and for people from \large families." And so on.
We suppose that the set of consumers f1 ; :::; h; :::ng is partitioned into N · n con-
sumer tax classes C1 ; :::; Ch; :::; CN . If N = n, then complete individualization of taxes
would be possible. If N = 1 , every consumer within the same generation would face the
same m's and ¿ 's. Some assumptions are implicit in our formulation. The partition is sta-
tionary: it is the same for each generation. Furthermore, individuals remain in the same
consumer tax class for their lifetimes. Neither of these assumptions a®ect our results. It
is also assumed that the young and old are never in the same tax class. Relaxing this last
assumption does a®ect our analysis. Being able to tax the young di®erently from the old
plays an important role in our proofs and examples.
There are other restrictions on government tax policies. It is in some instances impos-
sible or at least very costly for the government to tax \nearby" commodities at di®erent
rates. Imagine taxing white bread di®erently from whole wheat bread. This might im-
pose unreasonably high compliance costs on the bakers, while imposing unreasonably high
administrative cost on the tax authority.
We suppose therefore that the set of commodities f1 ; ::; i; ::: ; `g in any period is
partitioned into L · ` commodity tax classes, K1 ; ::: ;KI ; ::: ; KL. If L = 1 , then at any
given time all commodities must be taxed at the same rate. If L = `, then the restriction
to commodity tax classes is not binding. We formalize the notion of these restrictions on
government policy in the next de¯nition.
3.1 De¯nition A feasible ¯scal policy Á = (m; ¿) is a sequence of lump-sum
transfers m and a sequence of commodity tax rates ¿ that satis¯es
(1) msth = m
s
th¶ and ¿
s
th = ¿
s
th¶ for t = 0 ; 1 ; ::: and s = 1 ; 2 ; ::: for every h and h¶
in the same consumer tax class CH for H = 1 ; ::; N
and
(2) ¿ sith = ¿
si¶
th for t = 0 ; 1 ; ::: ; s = 1 ; 2 ;::: ; i = 1 ; :::; ` and i¶= 1 ; ::: ; ` for every
i and i¶in the same commodity tax class KI ; I = 1 ; ::: ; L.
The set of all feasible ¯scal policies is denoted by ©. If only lump-sum transfers are
available, then a feasible ¯scal policy is denoted by the sequence m; and the set of feasible
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¯scal policies is denoted byM. If only consumption taxes are available, then a feasible
¯scal policy is denoted by the sequence ¿ and the set of feasible ¯scal policies by T .
Since government expenditures are zero, the government budget de¯cit is the sum of
transfers less the sum of taxes. The government budget de¯cit in period t (t = 1; 2; : : :) is
h=nX
h=1
[mtt¡1 ;h +m
t
th ¡
i=X`
i=1
(¿ tit¡1 ;hx
ti
t¡1 ;h + ¿
ti
thx
ti
th)]:
If the constitutional restriction on the budget de¯cit is satis¯ed, then we have
h=nX
h=1
[mtt¡1 ;h +m
t
th ¡
i=X`
i=1
(¿ tit¡1 ;hx
ti
t¡1 ;h + ¿
ti
thx
ti
th)] = ±
t (3.2)
for t = 1 ; 2 ; :::; where ±t 2 R is the de¯cit restriction for period t and the sequence ±
is de¯ned by ± = (±1; ±2; : : : ; ±t; : : :). The restriction (3.2) is complicated when there are
consumption taxes. The m's enter (3.2) in a relatively sinple way, but the ¿ 's interact
with individual consumptions in determining whether (3.2) is satis¯ed. In this economy,
the government ¯nances its debt by \printing" money. Let M t be the money supply in
period t (t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ). If we assume M0 = 0, then M t is equal to the government debt
and ¢M t =M t ¡M t¡1 is equal to the government de¯cit in period t.
4. Equilibrium
We maintain throughout this paper some very strong assumptions. We suppose perfect-
foresight on the part of consumers and the government. We also suppose that the gov-
ernment is able to perfectly commit to its announced ¯scal policy.
Next we de¯ne equilibrium.
4.1 De¯nition Given the sequence of endowments !, the feasible ¯scal policy Á 2
© = M £ T , the behavior of consumers described by the systems (2.4) and (2.6), the
numeraire choice yielding p11 =1, the (further) monetary normalization yielding pm = 1
and the de¯cit sequence ± = (±1; : : : ; ±t; : : :), a constitutional competitive equilibrium is
de¯ned by two positive price sequences, p and q, the allocation sequence x such that
markets clear, i.e. we have
h=nX
h=1
(xtt¡1 ;h + x
t
t;h) =
h=nX
h=1
(!tt¡1 ;h + !
t
t;h)
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and the (constitutional) de¯cit restriction (3.2) is satis¯ed for t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: .
>From Balasko and Shell (1980), one might expect that the existence of competitive
equilibrium to be guaranteed in \nice" overlapping-generation models, but this does not
extend to our De¯nition 4.1. There are two reasons that competitive equilibrium as de¯ned
above could fail to exist. The ¯rst reason is because of the restriction pm = 1 , implying
that we are seeking a proper monetary equilibria. For a proper monetary equilibrium to
exist the ¯scal policy Á must be bona¯de2. The second reason is because of commodity
taxation. It might not be possible to equilibrate supply and demand while maintaining
the positivity of the two price sequences p and q.
A discussion of the constitutional restriction (3.2) is in order. The leading example
of restrictions on government de¯cits is the strict balanced{budget requirement: ±t =0
for t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: . Most actual constitutions are based on aversion to positive de¯cits with
typically no aversion to surpluses, so that a more realistic constraint would be in inequality
form, namely ¢M t · ±t: The equality version, ¢M t = ±t, is simpler to work with and our
basic results are not substatially a®ected by this choice. A slightly more serious worry
is that these constraints might be stated in real terms, even perhaps that they might be
based on economic performance as in the case of the Maastricht Treaty. This formulation
would create some problems in notation, but it would not a®ect our results. Even so, the
leading case is the strict balanced-budget restriction, ± = 0 ; which is the same in dollar
or real terms.
Since the government faces the period-by-period \budget constraints" given by (3.2)
rather than a single constraint, we are considering a general equilibrium economy in which
participation in the ¯nancial markets is restricted. In this case, it is the government that
cannot borrow freely. In most of the sequel, the other economic actors (the consumers)
are unrestricted in their borrowing, but in Section 7 we impose on consumers borrowing
restrictions similar to those imposed on the government.
In general, the restrictions (3.2) cannot be represented by simple restrictions on the set
© of feasible tax and transfers, because revenues from the consumption taxes depend on
the equilibrium allocation x. Indeed, because of the possible multiplicity of competitive
equilibrium, it might be the case that { ¯xing preferences, endowments, and the ¯scal
policy { for some of the competitive equilibria the de¯cit restrictions (3.2) are satis¯ed,
while for other competitive equilibria based on the same given parameters these de¯cit
restrictions are not satis¯ed.
2Bona¯delity of the government constitutional policies is basic to our present problem, but we do not
face this thorny problem head on. For the lump-sum tax case, see e.g. Balasko and Shell (1981, 1986,
1993) and Mitra (1988) for analyses that focus on bona¯delity.
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5. Irrelevance of de¯cit restrictions in the benchmark economy
For some overlapping-generations economies with a single (representative) consumer per
generation, perfect borrowing and lending markets for consumers and a full range of lump-
sum taxes and transfers, restrictions on the government budget have no impact on the set
of equilibrium allocations. The reason for this irrelevance result is that in these economies
only the present value of taxes and transfers, not their timing, matters to consumers. In
this case, the government can \borrow" freely from taxpayers by adjusting the timing
of individual taxes and transfers. See, for example, Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987) and
especially Kelly (1991).
The following Proposition extends the irrelevance result to economies with several (het-
erogeneous) consumers per generation, several commodities per period, (distortionary)
consumption taxes and transfers in addition to (non-distortionary) lump-sum taxes and
transfers, and restrictions on taxes to be \measurable" with respect to the consumer tax
classes and with respect to the commodity tax classes.
5.1 Proposition (Budget irrelevance if there are lump-sum taxes and transfers):
Let x = (x0 ; x1 ; ::: ; xt; ::: ) be an allocation that can be implemented as a competitive
equilibrium with some feasible ¯scal policy Á 2 © and with the resulting de¯cits given
by the sequence ±. Consider any other de¯cit sequence ±¶. Then there is a feasible ¯scal
policy Á¶2 © that implements as a competitive equilibrium the allocation x, but with the
resulting de¯cit given by the sequence ±¶.
Proof: We consider the least favorable case, the case in which taxes and transfers must
be made completely anonymously within a given generation, i.e. the case of N =1.
The demand function fth for consumer h of generation t (t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ) maps after-tax
consumer prices (qtth; q
t+1
th ) 2 R2`++ and wealth wth = pt¢!tth+pt+1 ¢!t+1th +mtth+mt+1th 2 R++
into consumption (xtth; x
t+1
th ) 2 R2 `++. In the case of generation 0 the demand function
f0h maps consumer prices q
1
0h 2 R`++ and income w0h = p1 ¢ !10h + m10h 2 R++ into
consumption x10h 2 R`++:
Therefore, fth depends solely on mth through the lifetime sum or present value ¹th =
mtth + m
t+1
th 2 R for t = 1 ; 2 ;... and ¹0h = m10h 2 R. We claim that the budget
speci¯cation is irrelevant because the sequence ¹ = (¹0 ; ¹1 ; ::: ; ¹t; ::: ) of lifetime transfers
is compatible with any de¯cit restrictions ± = (±0 ; ±1 ; ::: , ±t; ::: ):
To establish this claim, consider the ¯scal policy Á¶= (m; ¿)¶consistent with the budget
restriction ± = ((±1 ); ::; (±t); ::: ) de¯ned by
(¿ tt¡1 ;h)¶ = ¿
t
t¡1 ;h;
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(¿ tth)¶ = ¿
t
th;
(m10h)¶ = m
1
0h;
(mtth)¶ = (±
t)¶=n¡mtth;
and
(mt+1th )¶ = ¹t ¡ (mtth)¶:
for t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: and h = 1 ; ::: ; n. The tax policy Á¶ is (completely) anonymous and it
implements the allocation x while meeting the sequence of de¯cit restrictions ±¶. ¤
>From the proof of Proposition (5.1), it is very easy to see, and this is not surprising,
that the irrelevance result still holds when consumption taxes are not included in the set
of feasible tax instruments.
We conclude that if lump-sum taxes and transfers are included in the set of feasible
instruments, one lump-sum tax instrument per period is su±cient to make the budget
restriction irrelevant. In most of what follows, we suppose that lump-sum taxes and
transfers are not included in the set of tax instruments. That is, the set of feasible tax
policies is T .
6. Consumption taxes
6.1 Example (Relevance of ±): Consider a stationary overlapping-generations economy
with one commodity per period (` = 1 ) and two consumers per generation (n = 2 ). The
two consumers, Mr. t1 and Mr. t2, have respectively the log-linear utility functions and
endowments given by:
ut1(x
t
t1; x
t+1
t1 ) = (1=3 ) log x
t
t1 + (2=3 ) log x
t+1
t1 ;
!t1 = (!
t
t1; !
t+1
t1 ) = (1 ; 1 );
utb(x
t
t2; x
t+1
t2 ) = (1=2 ) log x
t
t2 + (1=2 ) log x
t+1
t2 ; (6.2)
and
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!tb = (!
t
t2; !
t+1
t2 ) = (3 ; 1 ):
For period t we have from (6.2) the system of demand functions
xtt¡1 ;1 =
2 (pt¡1 + pt)
3 qtt¡1 ;1
;
xtt1 =
pt + pt+1
3 qtt1
;
xtt¡1 ;2 =
3pt¡1 + pt
2 qtt¡1 ;2
; (6.3)
and
xtt2 =
3pt + pt+1
2 qtt2
;
where the p's are before-tax market prices and the q's are after-tax personalized prices.
We assume that taxes must be completely anonymous within a given generation, i.e. we
have N = 1 . There is only one commodity per period, i.e. we have L = ` = 1 . Because
of tax anonymity, we have
qtt¡1 ;1 = q
t
t¡1 ;2 = q
t
t¡1 ;
¿ tt¡1 ;1 = ¿
t
t¡1 ;2 = ¿
t
t¡1 ;
qtt1 = q
t
t2 = qt; (6.4)
and
¿ tt1 = ¿
t
t2 = ¿
t
t :
For convenience (and not more), we look at a steady state competitive equilibrium.
The steady state allocations associated with the zero-interest-rate steady state are given
by:
xt1 = (x
t
t1; x
t+1
t1 ) = (2=3 ; 4=3 )
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and (6.5)
xt2 = (x
t
t2;; x
t+1
t2 ) = (2 ; 2 ):
Can we use anonymous consumption taxes (¿ tt¡1; ¿
t
t ) to meet the de¯cit requirement ±
t in
period t without disturbing the allocations implemented by (6.5) ? Such a tax scheme
must satisfy for each t, (t = 1; 2; : : :) the following equations:
2 (pt¡1 + pt)
3 (pt + ¿ tt¡1 )
=
4
3
;
pt + pt+1
3 (pt + ¿ tt )
=
2
3
;
3pt¡1 + pt
2 (pt + ¿ tt¡1 )
= 2 ; (6.6)
3pt + pt+1
2 (pt + ¿ tt )
= 2 ;
and
(4=3 + 2 )¿
t
t¡1 + (
2=3 + 2 )¿
t
t = ¡±t:
Clearly, the only possible solution to the ¯rst four equations of (6.6) is of the form
pt = (¯)tp1 = (¯)t, ¿ tt = (¯)
t¿0 , and ¿ tt¡1 = (¯)
t¿ 1 , where ¯ 2 R is the interest factor,
¿0 2 R is the present value of the tax rate on the young and ¿1 2 R is the present value
of the tax rate on the old.
The ¯rst two equations in (6.6) yield ¿0 = 0 and ¯ = 1 . The second two equations yield
¿1 = 0 : The last equation in (6.6) states that the government revenue must be equal to
-±t. The government cannot implement the zero-interest-rate steady state allocation as a
constitutional equilibrium unless ±t = 0 for t = 1 ; 2 ; :::. Notice that in the above exercise,
the government was not initially restricted to only stationary ¯scal policies. ¤
Example (6.1) indicates that budget irrelevance can fail in economies both (1) with
only distortionary taxes and (2) without the power to completely individualize tax rates.
In example (6.1), there is only one commodity per period, l = L = 1. There are two
consumers per period, n = 2, but there is only one consumer tax class per period, N = 1.
The next proposition provides a necessary condition for generic irrelevance of restric-
tions on the government budget de¯cits. Roughly speaking, the condition is that the
number of instruments exceed the number of goals. This proposition and those that
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follow it hold only generically { i.e. for an open and dense set of economies. In this
way, degenerate cases { such as those in which individual endowments are colinear { are
excluded.
6.7 Proposition (A necessary condition for the irrelevance of ±): Let x be an
equilibrium allocation that can be implemented by the ¯scal policy ¿ 2 T with government
de¯cits ± = (±1 ; ::; ±t; :::): If we have
(`¡ 1 )N + n+ 1 > LN + `
then for almost all de¯cit sequences ±¶there is no ¯scal policy ¿¶2 T that implements the
equilibrium allocation x with government de¯cits ±¶= ((±1 )¶; ::: ; (±t)¶; ::: ):
6.8 Remark Suppose that the government is unconstrained by commodity tax classes;
i.e. we have L = `. Then Proposition 6.7 says that generically the de¯cit restriction does
not matter if the inequality ` + N ¸ n + 1 holds. In the case of a single consumer tax
class, N = 1 , this reduces to the simple condition that the number of commodities be at
least as great as the number of consumers, i.e. ` ¸ n is satis¯ed.
Proof of Proposition (6.7): The demand function of fth of consumer h from generation
t (t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ) is homogenous of degree zero in the after-tax prices qth = (q
t
th; q
t+1
th ) and
his wealth wth = p
t ¢ !tt + pt+1 ¢ !t+1t : Renormalize the arguments of the demand function
fth by dividing by q
t;1
th . The demand function fth then de¯nes a di®eomorphism between
the consumption set and R`¡1++ £ R`++ £ R++. Let Qth = (Qtth; Qt+1th ) 2 R`¡1++ £ R`++
and Wth 2 R++ be the value of the renormalized arguments of fth associated with the
constitutional equilibrium x that can be implemented with the budget de¯cit sequence
± = (±1 ; ::; ±t; ::: ). The demands fth remain constant as ± is changed to ±¶= ((±
1 )¶; ::: ; (±t)¶;
::: ) if and only if all the renormalized arguments of fth are una®ected. For each consumer
in generation 1 or later there are (2 ` ¡ 1 ) conditions coming from the price ratios and
one condition coming from his budget constraint. The constitutional restriction on the
government budget de¯cit adds the restriction on government revenue:
h=nX
h=1
(¿ tt¡1 ;h ¢ f tt¡1 ;h + ¿ tth ¢ f tth) = ¡±t:
The relevant system of equations for period t is then:
1
qt1th
(bpt + b¿ tth) = Qtth for h = 1 ; ::: ; n;
1
qt1th
(pt+1 + ¿ t+1th ) = Q
t+1
th for h = 1 ; ::: ; n;
1
qt1th
(pt ¢ !tht + pt+1 ¢ !t+1ht ) = Wht for h = 1 ; ::: ; n;
and
(6.9)
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h=nP
h=1
P`
i=1
[¿ tithf
ti
th(Q
t
th; Q
t+1
th ;Wth) + ¿
ti
t¡1 ;hf
ti
t¡1 ;h(Q
t¡1
t¡1 ;h; Q
t
t¡1 ;h;Wt¡1 ;h)] = ¡±t;
where right hand sides (Qtth; Q
t¡1
th ;Wth; and ±
t) are ¯xed and bpt 2 R`¡1++ and b¿ tth 2 R`¡1 are
respectively the vectors pt and ¿ tth without the ¯rst coordinate (p
t1 2 R++ or ¿ t1th 2 R): The
¯rst two lines in system (6.9) provide (2 `¡ 1 )n restrictions on the prices, but because of
the limited potency of the government only (2 `¡1 )N of these restrictions are independent.
Assume for the moment, that the pt and ¿ tth (h = 1 ; ::: ; n) are predetermined. (We will
justify this assumption when we consider consumer 0) Multiplication of (6.9) by qt1th 2 R++
creates a linear system of equations in 2LN + ` unknowns, i.e. 2LN independent tax
rates, (¿ tth; ¿
t+1
th ), and ` prices.
Comparing the number of equations and unknowns suggests that a necessary condition
for there to be a solution to the system (6.9) is that we have
(2 `¡ 1 )N + n+ 1 · 2LN + `:
Of course, a full argument should include the ranks of the relevant matrices. In the
Appendix, we show that provided the endowments of the individual consumers are not
colinear, these rank conditions are indeed ful¯lled.
To complete the argument, consumers from generation 0 must be considered. The
individual demand fth 2 R`++ of a consumer h of generation 0 has the form f10h(q10h; w0h)
with w0h = p
1 ¢ !1 + m10h. from homogeneity and the di®eomorphism property, the
individual demands are constant through a policy change if and only if the quantities
R10h 2 R`¡1++ and W0h 2 R++ de¯ned by
bp1 + b¿10h = (1 + ¿110h)R10h
and
p1 ¢ !10h +m10h = (1 + ¿110h)W0h
for h = 1 ; ::: ; n. For each consumer in generation 0, there are (`¡ 1 ) equations coming
from the prices and 1 equation coming from income. (Of course, p11 = 1 and pm = 1 are
¯xed.) Ignoring the redundant equations due to the limited potency of the government, the
system consists then of (`¡ 1 )N +n equations (the constraint on the government budget
is not included at this stage). On the other hand there are LN taxes and ` ¡ 1 prices.
Counting equations and unknowns, the necessary \counting condition" for existence of a
solution is then (`¡1 )N+n · LN+`¡1 . (The more complete rank computations of the
relevant matrices are provided in the Appendix.) Since we have (`¡1 )N+n · LN+`¡1
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and L · 1 , it follows that (2 `¡1 )N+n · 2LN+`¡1 and hence the necessary condition
for the theorem is ful¯lled. (Note that if L = ` both conditions coincide.) ¤
6.10 Remark Some Authors [see e.g. Kotliko® (1993)] either explicitly or implicitly
adopt a less stringent notion of the constitutional restrictions on budget de¯cits. For
these authors, a restriction is placed on the de¯cit in each period except the ¯rst period
(giving the government \one last chance.") As can readily be seen from the above proof,
even the weaker version of the government budget de¯cit restrictions can be relevant.
6.11 Remark It is not assured that qsith ¡ ¿ sith is positive, i.e. we could have for some s
(s = 1 ; 2 ; ::: ) and some i (i = 1 ; ::: ; `) that psi < 0 . This would be consistent with the
formal model, but is, of course, inconsistent with free disposal of endowments.
Hence, if we admit free disposal, the conditions in Proposition 6.9 are not su±cient for
irrelevance of restrictions on the government budget de¯cit. The next example shows that
there is a case for which the necessary condition is also su±cient and hence irrelevance of
budget restrictions holds.
6.12 Example (Irrelevance of ± in an economy with one commodity and one
consumer): Consider an overlapping-generations economy with one commodity per pe-
riod and one consumer per generation, i.e., l = L = 1 and n = N = 1. Consumption of
the commodity is taxed. The consumer is of the same type as consumer 1 in Example 6.1.
Consider the steady-state sequence of before-tax prices p = (p1 ; ¯p1 ; (¯)2p1 ; ::: ; (¯)t¡1p1 ;
::: ), where pt = (¯)t¡1p1 for t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: for ¯ 2 R. If markets clear, then we must have
2 (¯t¡1p1 + ¯tp1 )
3 (¯tp1 + ¿ tt¡1 )
+
¯tp1 + ¯t+1p1
3 (¯tp1 + ¿ tt )
= 2 :
In the absence of taxes this equation can be written as
(¯ ¡ 1 )(¯ ¡ 2 ) = 0 :
The steady state allocations associated with ¯ = 1 and ¯ = 2 are respectively (2=3 ;
4 =3 )
and (1 ; 1 ) : Consider the case in which the government policy leads to a stationary non-
zero government budget de¯cit ± 2 R . (In the sequel, we show that it can be obtained
with a constant consumption tax scheme. Of course, this means that for the time being
the transition from the no-tax situation to the tax situation is ignored.) Let ¿ tt¡1 = (¯)
t¿ 1
and ¿ tt = (¯)
t¿0 . Then the equations for the ¯rst (\monetary") steady state are:
2 (p+ ¯p)
3¯p+ 3¯¿ 1
=
4
3
;
p+ ¯p
3p+ 3 ¿ 0
=
2
3
;
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and
4 ¿1
3
+
2 ¿ 0
3
= ¡±t;
where for convenience ±t is expressed in current units rather than in present units. Sub-
stituing in the above equation yields
1 + ¯
1 + ¿0
= 2 ;
and
1 + ¯
[1 ¡ (3 ±=4 )¡ (¿0=2 )]¯ = 2 :
The ¯rst equation above reduces to ¯ = 2 ¿0 + 1 and then the second yields
4 (¿0 )2 ¡ (2 ¡ 6 ±)¿ 0 + 3 ± = 0 :
The solutions to this equation are given by
¿0 = ¡3
4
± +
1
4
§ 1
4
p
(1 ¡ 3 ±)2 ¡ 12 ±:
The only economically meaningful solutions are those such that ¿ 0 > ¡1 and ¿ 1 > ¡1
and hence ¡3
4
± ¡ 1
2
¿0 > ¡1 . It is trivial to see that for ± small the relevant value of the
tax is also small and the above conditions are ful¯lled (for ± ! 0 the other solution is
¿0 = 1
2
corresponding to the \real" steady state with the interest factor ¯ = 2 ). Consider,
for example, the case with ± = 0 :05 . Then ¿0 = 0 :125 , ¿ 1 = ¡0 :1 and the discount
factor is ¯ = 1 :25 . Clearly, in the case of small surpluses (¡1 << ± < 0 ) a solution also
exists and is such that ¿ 0 > ¡1 and ¿ 1 > ¡1 : ¤
One of the particularities of the above example is that it only deals with a stationary
budget policy and does not treat the transition to the steady state. The next example
allows for a non-stationary sequence of government de¯cit restrictions. This example also
shows that the necessary condition in Proposition 6.7 is not su±cient.
6.13 Example (Relevance of ± in an economy with one commodity and one
consumer): Consider the economy of example 6.12. Suppose that at time 1 a budget
restriction is imposed on the government ±1 < 0 for period 1 while ±t = 0 for t = 2 ; 3 :::
18
. The government wishes to change its ¯scal policy without disturbing the steady-state
allocation. It will begin by taxing the consumer of generation 1 at the rate ¿11 > 0 , while
leaving the old consumer untaxed. In order to ful¯ll the budget restriction ±1 the tax
should be such that 2
3
¿ 11 = ¡±1 . Then ¿ 11 = ¡32 ±1 . The second-period price p2 is obtained
using the demand of the young of generation 1 : p2 = 1 ¡ 3 ±1 . The old age demand
gives ¿21 =
3
2
±1 . In period 2 , the government has to ful¯ll ±2 = 0 . Therefore we have
(2=3 )¿ 22 +4=3 [(
3=2 )±
1 ] = 0 from which we get ¿22 = ¡3±1 and p3 = p2 +2 ¿22 = 1 ¡9 ±1 .
The same procedure can be repeated in general (for t > 1)
pt+1 = pt + 2 ¿ tt ;
2 ¿ t+1t + ¿
t+1
t+1 = 0;
and
¿ t+1t = ¡¿ tt :
The ¯rst terms in the sequence of prices are p4 = 1 ¡ 21 ±1 , p5 = 1 ¡ 45 ±1 and p6 =
1¡93 ±1 . The sequence is in fact de¯ned by pt+1 = pt¡3 ¢2 t¡1 ±1 . It is easily seen that for
any ±1 > 0 the condition on the positiveness of prices is violated after a ¯nite number of
periods. Therefore the tax sequence described above eventually becomes infeasible (after
a ¯nite number of iterations). On the other hand, restrictions to a positive government
de¯cit (surpluss) are always feasible in this example. ¤
These examples illustrate the fact that the set of policies that give the same allocation
as a given policy is usually not empty but that unfortunately this set is not easy to
characterize, even as a neighborhood of the original policy. Indeed, typically there may
not exist an open neighborhood in the supnorm topology of the original sequence of
budgets such that all sequences in that neighborhood are feasible and are associated to
the original allocation.
One way out is to weaken the notion of de¯cit restriction to one that applies only
to a ¯nite number of periods. In example (6.13), in the set of budget restrictions of
¯nite length there is a neighborhood of the original restriction for which we have generic
de¯cit irrelevance. De¯ne ±(T ) = (±1 ; ±2 ; : : : ; ±t ; : : : ; ±T ) to be a de¯cit restriction of ¯nite
length. For a competitive equilibrium to be constitutionaly feasible the de¯cit in period
t must be ±t if t = 1; 2; : : : ; T ; for t > T , de¯cit is unrestricted3.
3In Balasko and Shell (1986), it is shown that every strictly balanced ¯scal policy (one for which the
public debt is forever retired by some date T) is bona¯de. This is an approach to \getting rid" of the tails
to in¯nite budget sequences. The approach taken here is to \ignore" restrictions on the tails of in¯nite
budget sequences.
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In what follows, we consider a ¯rst T-period neighborhood, DT (±), of the de¯cit
restriction sequence ± = (±1 ; ±2 ; : : : ; ±t ; : : : ; ±T ; : : :).
6.14 Proposition (A su±cient condition for irrelevance of ±): Suppose that L = 1 .
Let x be a constitutional equilibrium allocation that can be implemented by the ¯scal
policy ¿ 2 T with de¯cits ±. Assume ` + N ¸ n + 1 . Then for almost all such ± there
exists an open neighborhood DT (±) of ± (over T periods), such that for all ±¶2 DT (±)
there is a ¯scal policy ¿¶that implements the allocation x.
Proof: The same rank conditions of the relevant matrices used in the proof of Propo-
sition 6.7 and proved in the Appendix show that the set of solutions is nonempty as
`+N ¸ n+ 1 . ¤
To conclude this section: we have shown that, when the only instruments are con-
sumption taxes, an exogenously given sequence of government budget restrictions can be
ful¯lled without changing the equilibrium allocation, but that this requires that there
is a su±ciently rich spectrum of di®erent tax instruments. Furthermore, the necessary
condition for irrelevance cannot be turned into a global su±ciency result. For su±ciency,
we need to be close to the comparison de¯cits and unrestricted in the tail of the de¯cit
sequence.
Note that the e®ective impact of de¯cit restrictions on social welfare depends on the
precise speci¯cation of the welfare function. However, one expects that social welfare
based on individual utilities will be generally reduced by budget de¯cit restrictions. Thus
budget speci¯cations have, in this case, a real e®ect on the economy.
7. Credit Restrictions
In the present section, we consider the relevance of government de¯cit restrictions when
at least some consumers face borrowing restrictions. These restrictions typically take the
form of a maximal amount of loan an individual can obtain, so that it is likely that in
equilibrium some consumers will ¯nd the borrowing constraints are binding.
Let bsth 2 R be the credit restriction in period s on consumer h from generation t. The
problem for consumer th is then
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maximize uht(x
t
th; x
t+1
th )
subject to
qtth ¢ xtth + xtmth = pt ¢ !tth +mtth;
qt+1th ¢ xt+1th + xt+1 ;mth = pt+1 ¢ !t+1th +mt+1th ;
xtmth ¸ pt1btth;
and
xtmth + x
t+1 ;m
th = 0 ;
(7.1)
where xsmth 2 R is the gross money holding in period s by consumer h of generation t.
If xsmth is negative, the consumer is borrowing in period s. The last equation in (7.1)
is the requirement that the consumer's indebtedness be zero in his latest period of life.
The inequality in (7.1) is the restriction of credit. In the system (7.1) it is implicitly
assumed that the borrowing of at least one consumer is unrestricted; hence we can set
ptm = pt+1 ;m = pm. Assuming that the economy is in proper monetary equilibrium,
we can without loss of generality set pm = 1 . The inequality in (7.1) puts the credit
restrictions in real terms rather than nominal terms. In the latter case, the constraint
would have been xtmth ¸ btth, assuming that the present price of money is set to unity. If
there are more than one commodity per period (` > 1 ), then a choice of price index is
required in the inequality in (7.1). We have chosen for simplicity to put the entire weight
on the current price of the ¯rst commodity. If the credit restriction were based on another
price index or stated in nominal (money) units, our results would not be a®ected.
The next result provides the conditions for the irrelevance of restrictions on government
de¯cit in economies with restrictions on consumer credit and lump-sum transfers.
Proposition 7.2 (Relevance of de¯cit restrictions with borrowing-contrained
consumers): Suppose that there is at least one consumer whose credit restriction is not
binding. Let the allocation x be implemented as a constitutional competitive equilibrium
with the ¯scal policy m 2 M consisting only of lump-sum transfers, with the de¯cit
restriction ±. If the government is able to \identify" the unrestricted consumer, then for
any de¯cit sequence ± there is a ¯scal policy m 2 M that implements the allocation x
as a constitutional competitive equilibrium. Otherwise, restrictions on the government
budget de¯cit can matter.
Proof: If the government can identify an unrestricted consumer, then renumber the
consumers so that consumer 1 is this consumer. Then the proof is the same as for
Proposition 5.1. If the government is unable to identify an unrestricted consumer, the
procedure in the proof of Proposition 5.1 fails, since a transfer may change the status
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of some consumer in respect to whether or not he is restricted and therefore change his
demand for commodities. ¤
Proposition 7.2 implies that ¯xing the government de¯cit sequence does not restrict
the set of implementable allocations that can be obtained with lump-sum transfers as
long as the government is able to individualize the transfer to some unrestricted consumer.
Identifying an unrestricted consumer is not always a realistic possibility. This is illustrated
in the following example.
7.3 Example (Relevance of ± in an 3-person economy with restrictions on
consumer's credit): Let the economy be stationary with one commodity per period and
three consumers. Perfectly anonymous lump-sum taxes and transfers are available. The
three consumers, noted as 1, 2, and 3, are characterized by the log-linear utility functions
uth = 1=2 log x
t
th + 1=2 log x
t+1
th
for h = 1, 2, 3 and t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: . Endowments are given
!t1 = (!
t
t1; !
t+1
t1 ) = (1 ; 1 );
!t2 = (!
t
t2; !
t+1
t2 ) = (1 ; 5 );
and
!t3 = (!
t
t3; !
t+1
t3 ) = (2 ; 1 ):
Consider date t. Let the de¯cit speci¯cation be ±t = 0 . Suppose the borrowing of
consumer 1 is unrestricted but that consumers of types 2 and 3 cannot borrow btt2 = 0
and btt3 = 0 . Then (p; ¯) = (1 ; 1 ) represents a steady state equilibrium price system.
The corresponding equilibrium allocations are
xt1 = (x
t
t1; x
t+1
t1 ) = (1 ; 1 );
xt2 = (x
t
t2; x
t+1
t2 ) = (1 ; 5 );
and
xt3 = (x
t
t3; x
t+1
t3 ) = (3=2 ; 3=2 ):
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Suppose now that the government is required to run a surplus in every period with
±t = ¡30 for t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: .
It is easy to see that the new restriction on the de¯cits must lead to a modi¯cation of
the existing allocation. The government can either transfer to the young or to the old.
Suppose it transfers to the young. The procedure is similar to that used in the proof
of Proposition 5.1. Suppose, since the consumers of the same generation are perfectly
anonymous, that we give each of them ten units in lump-sum taxes, e.g.. we have mtt1
= mtt2 = m
t
t3 = 10 . Suppose that we tax each of the old ten units, i.e. m
t
t¡1 ;1 = m
t
t¡1 ;2 =
mtt¡1 ;3 = ¡10 . Consumers of type 2 will have substantial liquidity when young and will
not have a need to borrow. Hence we have xt2 = (3 ; 3 ): the equilibrium allocation x
has been altered. By taxing the young so that mtt1 = m
t
t2 = m
t
t3 < 0 , the allocation
will be a®ected by the increased liquidity constraints on the restricted consumers. Hence
the allocation x which was supportable as a constitutional equilibrium with ±t = 0 for
t = 1 ; 2 ; ::: , is not supportable as a constitutional equilibrium with (±t)¶ = ¡30 for
t = 1 ; 2 ; :::. ¤
When only taxes on consumption are available, the conditions for irrelevance of de¯cit
restrictions rests on the di®erence between the number of tax instruments and the number
of consumers. The next proposition is based on the economy in which only perfectly
anonymous consumption taxes are available to the government. A typical situation is
one in which some consumers are restricted by the credit rationing while others not.
Besides the conditions that apply when rationing is absent, a new set of inequalities must
be satis¯ed for de¯cits to be irrelevant. Clearly a su±cient condition is that the real
borrowings and lendings be unaltered by a change in ±.
7.4 Proposition (Relevance of ± in economies with consumption taxes and
consumer borrowing restrictions): Suppose that only anonymous consumption taxes
are available and that the credit of at least one consumer is not restricted. Let x be an
allocation that can be implemented as a constitutional equilibrium with an (anonymous)
¯scal policy ¿ 2 T and de¯cit restriction ±. Then, if n · `=2 for any de¯cit restriction
satisfying the conditions of Proposition 6.14, there is a ¯scal policy ¿¶2 T that implements
the equilibrium allocation x: In the case `=2 < n · `, such a policy ¿¶2 T may or may
not exist, while for ` < n, it simply fails to exist.
Proof: When consumers are potentially restricted, demand for commodities may depend
on the individual borrowings or lendings, so that these must be kept constant when
the policy changes. Formally, xtmth =p
t1, with xtmth = p
t ¢ !tth ¡ qtth ¢ xtth, is kept constant
for constrained consumers. Denote this quantity by b
t
th. Furthermore, since there is an
unconstrained consumer, prices in successive periods are linked. Therefore, in period t the
relevant system consists of 2 ` ¡ 1 conditions on prices and 2n conditions on individual
wealth. Taking into account the restriction on the de¯cit, the system of 2 `+2n equations
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can be written as
bpt + b¿ tt = (pt1 + ¿ t1t )Rtt;
pt+1 + ¿ t+1t = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )R
t+1
t ;
pt ¢ !tth ¡ pt1b
t
th = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )W
t
t;h;
pt ¢ !tth + pt+1 ¢ !t+1th = (pt1 + ¿ t1t )Wth;
and
Ph=n
h=1
Pi=`
i=1 ¿
ti
t f
ti
th(R
t
t; R
t+1
t ;Wth) + ¿
t;i
t¡1f
t;i
t¡1 ;h(R
t¡1
t¡1 ; R
t
t¡1 ;Wt¡1 ;h) = ¡±t;
for i = 1 ; ::: , `, where the R's, theW's, and the ±'s are ¯xed. Remark that due to the ¯rst
and second set of equations, the constraints on xtmth do not involve the allocations. Note
also that here individual demands for a constrained consumer may depend only trivially
on some of the arguments speci¯ed above.
Suppose that n · `. In the Appendix, it is shown that it is useful to consider as \free"
variables the last ` ¡ n prices of period t: pt;n+1 , ::: ,pt` and the ¯rst n prices of period
t + 1 : pt+1 ;1 ; ... ; pt+1 ;n. This system, which is linear in 3 ` unknowns, has a solution if
and only if n · `=2 . The usual sign restrictions on the p's applies so this condition is not
su±cient. The second part of the proposition is true because of the fact that the policy
change may not alter the distribution of restricted consumers. . ¤
7.5 Remark: The general case of individualized taxes can be deduced from Proposition
7.4. Also note that irrelevance breaks down even if the ¯rst period de¯cit is unrestricted.
An interesting question concerns the possibility that the government might be able to
provide enough individual liquidity to \free" each consumer from his credit restriction.
This would be an action that could improve social welfare. Consider then an economy in
which some of the consumers are not able to borrow as they would like to. A seemingly
attractive ¯scal policy would be to proceed to a su±ciently large lump-sum transfer to
the consumers in their youth and an equally large tax in their old age. Does the feasibility
of such a policy depend on the de¯cit restrictions imposed on the government?
The conditions for making each consumer liquid are in fact identical to those for the
irrelevance of the de¯cit restrictions. Indeed, when a \free consumer" can be found,
a liquidity possibility can be obtained in a fashion similar to that for Proposition 7.4.
When no free consumer can be identi¯ed and/or only anonymous lump-sum transfers are
used, the irrelevance result can be obtained only if the speci¯cation does not concern the
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¯rst period of the economy (or, the ¯rst period of the economic plan). This is because,
when individuals cannot be di®erentiated, large initial transfers to the young restricted
consumers have to be balanced by an equally large tax on the old consumers, an action
which has serious welfare consequences in the ¯rst period. When consumption taxes are
applied, no clear result can be obtained, since the existence of the full-liquidity scheme is
only established for a subset of the set of de¯cit sequences (see Proposition 6.14).
8. Concluding remarks
We hope we have shed some light on a puzzle about restrictions on the government's
budget de¯cit. Politicians seem to be convinced that such restrictions matter a lot (per-
haps for good, perhaps for ill). The existing theoretical literature suggests that these
restrictions don't matter.
We go beyond the simple economies with only lump-sum taxation or only one consumer
per generation or only one commodity per generation. We show that de¯cit irrelevance
requires an unrealistically large number of independent policy tools. Even with these
tools, de¯cit irrelevance is far from guaranteed. If large changes in de¯cit are required
then de¯cit restrictions may be relevant. If restrictions are imposed on the full in¯nite path
of de¯cits, then these restrictions might matter { in fact, they could well be inconsistent
with any equilibrium.
The budget de¯cit is typically a complicated function of the tax rate and the equi-
librium allocation (which itself depends on the tax rates). Because of the possibility of
multiple equilibria, the de¯cit is not a single-valued function of the tax rates. This is
what makes the analysis complicated.
We assume perfect foresight and once-and-for-all perfect commitement by the con-
sumers and government. In the case of the government, this is an heroic assumption.
There is one very important caveat: The notion in this paper of \de¯cit restriction
irrelevance" (or, \restriction on the government budget de¯cit do not matter") could be
misleading. We study here the class of all rational expectations equilibria. Particular
rational-expectations equlibria might be conditioned on observed or projected budget
de¯cits.
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Appendix: Rank computations
Consumption taxes
In order to obtain the relevant rank conditions we will consider the two polar cases.
Individualized taxes. Here we suppose that N = n and L = l, i.e. the government
can perfectly distinguish the consumers and is able to apply a di®erent tax rate to every
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commodity. For a consumer h of generation t = 1; 2; : : :, the relevant linear system can
be written in matrix form
Atzt =
2664
0 ¡Qtt In(l¡1) 0
J ln ¡Qt+1t 0 Inl
!t+1t ¡Wt 0 0
0 f t1t f^
t
t 0
3775
2664
pt+1
¿ t1t
¿^ tt
¿ t+1t
3775 =
2664
¡Pt + pt1Qtt ¢ Jn
pt1Qt+1t ¢ Jn
¡!ttPt + pt1Wt ¢ Jn
±t ¡Pnh=1Pli=1 ¿ tit¡1hf tit¡1;h
3775 ;
where the matrices Qst , J ln, !t and Wt and the vectors Jn, Pt, ¿
s
t and !
t
t are de¯ned by
Qst =
26664
Qst1 0 : : : 0
0 Qst2 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : Qstn
37775, Qtth 2 Rl¡1 and Qt+1th 2 Rl
J ln =
26664
Il
Il
...
Il
37775
ln£l
; Jn =
26664
1
1
...
1
37775
n£1
, Pt =
26664
pt
pt
...
pt
37775
ln£1
; ¿ st =
26664
¿ st1
¿ st2
...
¿ stn
37775
ln£1
;
!t+1t =
26664
!t+1;1t1 ; !
t+1;2
t1 ; : : : ; !
t+1;l
t1
!t+1;1t2 ; !
t+1;2
t2 ; : : : ; !
t+1;l
t2
...
...
...
...
!t+1;1tn ; !
t+1;2
tn ; : : : ; !
t+1;l
tn
37775
n£l
; !tt
0
=
26664
!tt1
!tt2
...
!ttn
37775
ln£1
;
and W (t) =
26664
wt1 0 : : : 0
0 wt2 : : : 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 : : : wtn
37775
n£n
:
The notation for the individual demands is given by
f t1t = (f
t1
th(Q
t
th; Q
t+1
th ; wth))
n
h=1;
f^ tt = (f
ti
th(Q
t
th; Q
t+1;i
th ; wth))
i=2;:::;l
h=1;:::;n;
and
f t+1t = (f
t+1
th (Q
t
th; Q
t+1
th ; wth))
i=1;:::;l
h=1;:::;n:
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Similar notation appears for taxes ¿ t1t , ¿^
t
t and ¿
t+1
t .
The rank of the matrix At is equal to the rank of the matrix24 0 ¡Qtt In(l¡1)!t+1t ¡Wt 0
0 f t1t f^
t
t
35
plus ln. By a sequence of manipulations involving the ¯rst n(l ¡ 1) rows of this last
matrix, the rank of the At matrix is seen to be equal to the rank of the n + 1 £ n + l
matrix
M =
·
0 §(t)
!t+1t ¡Wt
¸
n+1£n+l
plus 2nl ¡ n where §(t) is given by
§(t) = (
lX
i=2
f tit1Q
ti
t1 + f
t1
t1 ; : : : ;
lX
i=2
f titnQ
ti
tn + f
t1
tn):
Note that, since the coordinates of §(t) represent the ¯rst period wealth of the consumers,
we generally have §(t) 2 (R n f0g)n.
Suppose that n · l, then the matrix Mt has rank n+ 1 when !t+1t has maximal rank,
a generical property for non-colinear endowments. In this case, the matrix At has rank
2nl + 1 and the set of solution of Atxt = bt is nonempty.
If n > l, let p = n¡ l so that the rank of the matrix M is equal to p+1 plus the rank
of the square matrix 2666664
!t+1;1t1 !
t+1;2
t1 : : : !
t+1;l
t1
!t+1;1t2 !
t+1;2
t2 : : : !
t+1;l
t2
...
...
...
...
!t+1t;n¡p¡1 !
t+1;2
t;n¡p¡1 : : : !
t+1;l
t;n¡p¡1
- 11n¡pt -
12
n¡pt : : : -
1l
n¡pt
3777775
l£l
with - 1in¡pt = §
¡1
n wn
Pn¡p
s=0 !
n¡st;i
n¡st (w
¡1
n¡s§n¡s). The rank of this last matrix can be seen
to be maximal for an open and dense set of endowments. Hence the matrix Mt has rank
n¡ l + 1 + l = n+ 1 and the set of solutions of Atxt = bt is also nonempty.
Anonymous consumption taxes. Here we suppose that N = 1 and L = l, i.e. the
government cannot discriminate any of the consumers in a given generation but is able to
use a di®erent tax for each commodity. The extension to the case L < l is straightforward.
The linear system associated to a consumer of generation 0 can be written as A1z1 = b1
or
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26664
Il¡1 ¡R10 Il¡1
¡W1 0
!^10
...
¡Wn 0
37775
l+n¡1£2l
24 p^1¿ 111
¿^11
35
2l¡1£1
=
26664
R10
W1 ¡ !1101 ¡m101
...
Wn ¡ !110n ¡m10n
37775
l+n¡1£1
with
!^t+1t =
26664
!t+1;2t1 !
t+1;3
t1 : : : !
t+1;l
t1 t+ 1
!2t2(t+ 1) !
t+1;3
t2 : : : !
t+1;l
t2
...
...
...
...
!2tn(t+ 1) !
t+1;3
tn : : : !
t+1;l
tn
37775
n£l¡1
:
The rank of the matrix A1 is equal to the rank of the matrix264 ¡W1!^10 ...
¡Wn
375
n£l+1
plus l ¡ 1. It is trivial to prove that the above matrix has maximal rank. Therefore, the
matrix A has rank l ¡ 1 + min(n; l + 1) while there are 2l unknowns. For n = l there
are 2l equations, therefore a solution always exists although the dimension of the solution
set is zero. The unknowns pt and ¿ tt¡1 are determined, independently of any budget
speci¯cation. This remark holds also in the case with n > l since then new equations are
added to the system while no new unknown is considered.
Consider now the consumers of generation t ¸ 1, with the constraint that the price in
period t is already ¯xed. In matrix form, the relevant system of equations that include
the budget restriction can be written as Atzt = bt or2664
0 ¡Rtt Il¡1 0
Il ¡Rt+1t 0 Il
!t+1t ¡Wt ¢ Jn 0 0
0
Pn
h=1 f
t1
th
Pn
h=1 f^
t
th 0
3775
2664
pt+1
¿ t1t
¿^ tt
¿ t+1t
3775 =
2664
¡p^t + pt1Rtt
pt1Rt+1t
¡!ttPt + pt1Wt ¢ Jn
±t ¡Pnh=1Pli=1 ¿ tit¡1f tit¡1;h
3775
where the individual demands are denoted by f t1th = f
t1
th(R
t
t; R
t+1
t ;Wth), f^
t
th =
(f tith(R
t
t; R
t+1
t ;Wth))i=2;:::;l and f
t+1
th = (f
t+1;i
th (R
t
t; R
t+1
t ;Wth))i=1;:::;l. The taxes ¾
t1
t , ¾^
t
t and
¾tt¡1 follows the same notation.
The rank of the matrix At is equal to the rank of the matrix
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24 0 ¡Rtt Il¡1!t+1t ¡Wt ¢ Jn 0
0
Pn
h=1 f
t1
th
Pn
h=1 f^
t
th
35
plus l. By a sequence of manipulations involving the ¯rst l ¡ 1 raws of this last matrix,
the rank of the matrix At is seen to be equal to the rank of the n+ 1£ l + 1 matrix·
0 §(t)
!t ¡W (t) ¢ Jn
¸
plus 2l ¡ 1 where §(t) = Pnh=1Pli=2 f tithRtit +Pnh=1 f t1th . Each of the terms of the sum
over of consumers in §(t) represent the ¯rst period wealth of the consumers, therefore
generically §(t) will not be zero. Then the matrix At has maximal rank if the matrix !
has maximal rank, which follows if the initial endowments are not colinear. The rank of
the matrix A is then min(2l + n; 3l).
The system has no solution if Rank(At) < Rank(At; bt). The rank of the augmented
matrix is equal to the rank of the matrix24 0 ¡Rtt Il¡1 ¡pt + pt1Rtt!t+1t ¡Wt ¢ Jn 0 ¡!ttPt + pt1Wt ¢ Jn
0
Pn
h=1 f
t1
th
Pn
h=1 f^
t
th ±
t ¡Pnh=1Pli=1 ¿ tit¡1f tit¡1;h
35
n+l£2l+1
plus l. If n = l+1 this is a square matrix. It has full rank 2l+1 for an open and dense set
of values of ±t provided that the coe±cient of ±t in the polynomial expression representing
the determinant of (At; bt) is nonzero. Since this coe±cient is the determinant of·
0 ¡Rtt Il¡1
!t+1t ¡Wt ¢ Jn 0
¸
2l£2l
;
the relevant condition is that the determinant of
£
!t+1t ¡Wt ¢ Jn
¤
=
26664
!t1t¡1;1; !
t2
t¡1;1; : : : ; !
tl
t¡1;1 ¡Wt1
!t1t¡1;2; !
t2
t¡1;2; : : : ; !
tl
t¡1;2 ¡Wt2
...
...
...
...
...
!t1t¡1;n; !
t2
t¡1;n; : : : ; !
tl
t¡1;n ¡Wtn
37775
l+1£l+1
is nonzero. This determinant is generically nonzero because Wh involves both !
t
th and
!t+1th . Therefore, for a dense and open set of budget speci¯cations when n = l + 1,
Rank(At) = 3l < 3l+ 1 = Rank(At; bt), i.e. the system has no solution. Of course this is
the knife edge case. For n · l, Rank(At) = Rank(At; bt) and the system has a solution,
while for n ¸ l + 1 there is no solution.
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Credit restrictions and consumption taxes
For notational convenience, we focus attention on the case n ¸ 2. First, consider a
consumer of generation 0. It is clear from the last section, that the set of free parameters
left after imposing the condition of constant individual demands to these consumers is a
set of dimension l ¡ n. Let us then consider as free the last l ¡ n prices p1;n+1; : : : ; p1;l.
Second, consider the consumers of generation t, (t = 1; 2; : : :), with the constraint that
the prices pt1; : : : ; ptn are already ¯xed (from previous-period conditions).
Using the relationship between the price levels in periods t and t + 1, the system of
equations associated to a given demand can be written as:
p^t + ¿^ tt = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )R
t
t
pt+1 + ¿ t+1t = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )R
t+1
t
pt!tth ¡ pt1b
t
th = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )W
t
th for i = 1; : : : ; n
pt!tth + p
t+1!t+1th = (p
t1 + ¿ t1t )Wth for i = 1; : : : ; nPn
h=1
Pl
i=1 ¿
ti
t f
ti
th(R
t
t; R
t+1
t ;Wth)+
+¿ tit¡1)f
ti
t¡1;h(R
t
t¡1; R
t
t¡1);Wt¡1;h) = ±
t
where the quantities Rtt 2 Rl¡1, Rtt¡1 2 Rl, W tth, Wth and ±t are ¯xed. The system
of 2l ¡ 1 + 2n + 1 = 2l + 2n equations becomes linear in 3l unknowns, pt;n+1; : : : ; pt;l,
pt+1;1; : : : ; pt+1;n, ¿ tt and ¿
t+1
t .
Introduce the vectors P t0 2 Rl¡n and P t+11 2 Rn de¯ned by
P t0 =
26664
pt;n+1
pt;n+2
...
pt;l
37775 and P t+11 =
26664
pt+1;1
pt+1;2
...
pt+1;n
37775 :
In matrix form, the system can be written as Atzt = bt with
At =
26666666664
0 0 ¡Rtt In¡1 0 0 0
Il¡n 0 ¡Rtt 0 Il¡n 0 0
0 In ¡Rt+1t 0 0 In 0
0 0 ¡Rt+1t 0 0 0 Il¡n
!tt 0 ¡W tt ¢ Jn 0 0 0 0
!tt !
t+1
t ¡W t+1t ¢ Jn 0 0 0 0
0 0
Pn
h=1 f
t1
th
Pn
h=1 f^
t
th 0 0
37777777775
2(l+n)£3l
;
Rtt =
26664
Rt2t
Rt3t
...
Rtnt
37775
n¡1£1
; R
t
t =
26664
Rt;n+1t
Rt;n+2t
...
Rtlt
37775
l¡n£1
; Rt+1t =
26664
Rt+1;1t
Rt+1;2t
...
Rt+1;nt
37775
n£1
;
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R
t+1
t =
26664
Rt+1;n+1t
Rt+1;n+2t
...
Rt+1;lt
37775
l+n£1
; !tt =
26664
!t;n+1t1 !
t;n+2
t1 : : : !
tl
t1
!t;n+1t2 !
t;n+2
t2 : : : !
tl
t2
...
...
...
...
!t;n+1tn !
t;n+2
tn : : : !
tl
tn
37775
n£l¡n
;
!t+1t =
26664
!t+1;1t1 !
t+1;2
t1 : : : !
t+1;n
t1
!t+1;1t2 !
t+1;2
t2 : : : !
t+1;n
t2
...
...
...
...
!t+1;1tn !
t+1;2
tn : : : !
t+1;n
tn
37775
n£n
; and zt =
266666664
P tt
P t+1t
¿ t1t
¿ t2t
...
¿ t+1;lt
377777775
: Let also W tt 2 Rn
and Wt 2 Rn be the vectors of
individual wealth. The rank of the matrix At is equal to the rank of the matrix
266664
0 0 ¡Rtt In¡1 0
Il¡n 0 ¡Rtt 0 Il¡n
!tt 0 ¡W tt ¢ Jn 0 0
!tt !
t+1
t ¡Wt ¢ Jn 0 0
0 0
Pn
h=1 f
t1
th
Pn
h=1 f^
t
th
377775
l+2n£2l
plus l. Some tedious manipulations similar to those performed in the previous section,
show that generically the above matrix has maximal rank. Then, for l = 2n the At matrix
has full rank 3l. In this case the system has always a solution. The same can be said for
2n < l.
Suppose now that l + 1 = 2n. Then the At matrix is a 3l + 1 £ 3l matrix which
has generically maximal rank 3l. Consider the square 3l + 1 matrix associated to the
augmented system, (At; bt) and let us prove that Rank (At; bt) = 3l + 1. Indeed, the last
coordinate of bt is a function of ±t that can be written as
±t ¡
nX
h=1
lX
i=1
¿ tit¡1f
ti
it¡1:
The determinant of (At; bt) is a ¯rst degree polynomial expression in ±
t. Therefore, to
prove that the relevant matrix has full rank for an open and dense set of values of ±t it
is enough that the coe±cient of ±t in the polynomial expression is nonzero, which can be
seen to be generically true. Since Rank(A) < Rank(A; b), the solution set is empty. Of
course, this is the borderline case so the same result holds also whenever 2n > l + 1.
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